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and encouraging comments.Abstract. This paper studies the Nash solution to nonconvex bargaining
problems. The Nash solution in such a context is typically multi-valued.
We introduce a procedure to exclude some options recommended by the
Nash solution. The procedure is based on the idea of the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution which has the same informational requirement on individual utilities
as the Nash solution does and has an equity consideration as well. We then
use this procedure to introduce two new solutions to nonconvex bargaining
problems and study them axiomatically.
J.E.L. Classication Numbers: C71, C78, D6, D71 Introduction
In this paper, we study solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems from a
procedural perspective by employing the Nash solution (Nash (1950)) and
the Kalai-Smorodinsky (KS) solution (Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975)) se-
quentially. We know that the Nash solution has a greater eciency con-
sideration than the KS solution while the KS solution has a greater equity
consideration than the Nash solution. The sequential applications of the two
solutions thus combine both eciency concerns and equity concerns in for-
mulating a solution to nonconvex bargaining problems. More precisely, in
this paper, we dene and study solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems
by rst employing the Nash solution concept to make recommendations for
nonconvex bargaining problems and |among the options recommended by
the Nash solution| then we use a procedure based on the idea of the KS
solution with reference to an ideal point to select nal options for the given
bargaining problem.
Our proposed solutions have several features. First, the solutions pro-
posed in this paper are renements of the Nash solution to nonconvex bar-
gaining problems. In nonconvex bargaining problems, the Nash solution is
typically multi-valued (see, among others, Kaneko (1980), Mariotti (1998,
1999), Wu (2006), Xu and Yoshihara (2006), and Peters and Vermeulen
(2007))1: for a given nonconvex bargaining problem, the recommendation
by the Nash solution may contain more than one option. This is because,
as Mariotti (1998, 1999) shows, there is no single-valued solution satisfying
the Nash axioms in nonconvex problems. Due to this multi-valuedness of
the Nash solution, it would be desirable to have a procedure to exclude some
options recommended by the Nash solution, if in particular such options are
deemed to be undesirable from the viewpoint of distributive fairness. Given
this, a natural way of proposing a renement of the Nash solution would be
to introduce a procedure based on an equity concept.2 One such procedure
1Note that Kaneko (1980) proposes and characterizes the Nash solution in nonconvex
problems as the set of Nash product maximizers, and Mariotti (1998, 1999), Xu and Yoshi-
hara (2006) provide alternative characterizations of this solution, while Herrero (1989)
denes a generalization of Nash solution on strictly comprehensive two-person domain as
a superset of the Nash product maximizers.
2Note that, in nonconvex problems, Zhou (1997) investigates a single-valued selection
from the asymmetric Nash solution by dropping the anonymity axiom, whereas Conley
and Wilkie (1996) propose and characterize an extension of the Nash solution by keeping
single-valuedness while dropping the eciency axiom. In contrast to these works, this
3is based on the idea of the KS solution: the KS solution has the same infor-
mational requirement on individual utilities as the Nash solution does, and
has an equity consideration linking the utility gains of the players with re-
spect to their maximum attainable utilities by equalizing proportional gains
of individual utilities.
Secondly, the sequential procedure of our solutions is a natural method
to reconcile the conicting criteria such as eciency and equity considera-
tions. Indeed, Tadenuma (2002) has considered the sequential application
of eciency and fairness criteria to problems of resource allocations under
exchange economies. Moreover, there is another recent literature on sequen-
tially rationalizable choices and on bounded rational choice (see, for example,
Apesteguia and Ballester (2008), Manzini and Mariotti (2006), and Manzini
and Mariotti (2007)), which discuss similar issues as this paper does. In those
papers, however, they study sequential rationalizability of choice functions.
Specically, they ask the following question: can the observed choices be
explained by rst employing an incomplete binary relation over the univer-
sal set to exclude some options and then employing another binary relation
over the same universal set to select certain options from those surviving
the elimination in the rst round? At this point, we may note that nei-
ther of our solutions can respectively be explained as a specic sequentially
rationalizable choice function. In our context, the observed solution out-
comes can be explained by employing the strict part of the ordering based
on the Nash product to exclude certain options in the rst round, and then
employing an ordering based on the idea of the KS solution to select cer-
tain options from those surviving the rst round elimination. However, the
second-round binary relation cannot be dened independently of option sets,
and can only be dened endogenously for each option set,3 which makes our
solutions dierent from sequentially rationalizable choice functions studied
in the above-mentioned literature. See Section 4 for a further elaboration on
this feature of our solutions.
It is an attractive feature of our solutions not to be sequentially rational-
izable. This is because fairness criteria are context dependent as they often
use information about feasible options. The notion of fairness is more pro-
paper investigates a renement of the Nash solution by explicitly introducing a procedure
for the renement while keeping most of Nash's axioms.
3This property is not the same as allowing the \menu eects", since there is a sequen-
tially rationalizable solution to nonconvex bargaining problems which allows the \menu
eects", as Manzini and Mariotti (2006) discuss.
4cedurally based, and the important information to make a fairness judgment
may come from what social outcomes being selected from which feasible op-
tion sets, rather than just from what social outcomes being chosen. In this
case, the corresponding binary relation over options may not be dened in-
dependently of the information about the underlying option sets. The idea
of fairness embedded in the KS solution that we are interested in this paper
is procedurally based.
It may be noted that even if our solutions are not sequentially ratio-
nalizable, their rst round choice procedures themselves are rationalizable.
This property of our solutions seems reasonable whenever the rst criterion
is based on eciency considerations. Eciency considerations are often such
that the underlying binary relations over options are independent of the sets
of feasible options. If one is interested in employing a solution that is ef-
cient as a rst round choice procedure, then the question, which solution
should be employed, arises naturally. As we shall discuss in Section 3, if
the rst round choice procedure is required to reect the eciency criterion
and be rationalizable, then one is left with the Nash solution concept in a
framework of cardinal and non-comparable individual utilities. This gives
us a justication for employing the Nash solution as the rst round choice
procedure.
The two new solutions proposed and studied in the paper combine the
Nash solution and the KS solution sequentially with dierent ideal points for
nonconvex bargaining problems. In the rst place, we choose the ideal point
of the originally given problem as the referenced ideal point and dene our
rst solution accordingly. In the second place, we choose the ideal point of
the problem derived from the Nash solution to the original problem as the
referenced ideal point and dene our second solution based on this ideal point.
It can be argued that our two solutions attempt to select those maximum-
Nash-product points that are also \equitable".4
A chosen referenced ideal point may reect players' perspectives about
their maximum attainable utilities that are \feasible". For example, when
the ideal point of the original problem is used as a reference point for mak-
ing further recommendations, the players could be viewed as not updating
4Note that Conley and Wilkie (1996) propose an \equitable" Nash extension solution
in nonconvex problems, which is taken as a hybrid of the Nash and the KS solutions.
However, this solution is very dierent from the two solutions proposed in this paper, in
the sense that their solution does not satisfy the eciency criterion and is not a renement
of the Nash solution.
5the information and continuing to believe the attainability of the original
maximum attainable utilities. On the other hand, when the referenced ideal
point is the ideal point of the problem derived from the Nash solution to the
original problem, the players could be viewed as having updated the infor-
mation and as realizing that the nal chosen options must be from the set
of the Nash solution to the original problem, and, as a consequence, they
would re-adjust their views on the maximum attainable utilities. Putting
this observation dierently, our rst solution seems to suggest no \learning"
and no \updating" on the part of the players while our second solution seems
to suggest that there is learning and updating about the perceived maximum
attainable utilities from the players.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
present notations and denitions. Section 3 introduces a set of our core
axioms and studies their implications on nonconvex problems. Section 4
introduces the two new solutions. Section 5 is devoted to the study of our rst
solution, and Section 6 is concerned with our second solution. We conclude
in Section 7.
2 Notation and denitions
Let N = f1;2;:::;ng be the set of players with n  2. Let R+ be the set
of all non-negative real numbers and R++ be the set of all positive numbers.
Let Rn
+ (resp. Rn
++) be the n-fold Cartesian product of R+ (resp. R++).
For any x;y 2 Rn
+, we write x  y to mean [xi  yi for all i 2 N], x > y
to mean [xi  yi for all i 2 N and x 6= y], and x  y to mean [xi > yi
for all i 2 N]. For any x 2 Rn
+ and any non-negative number , we write
z = (;x i) 2 Rn
+ to mean that zi =  and zj = xj for all j 2 N n fig. For
any subset A  Rn
+, A is said to be (i) non-trivial if there exists a 2 A such
that a  0, and (ii) comprehensive if for all x;y 2 Rn
+, [x > y and x 2 A]
implies y 2 A. For all A  Rn
+, dene the comprehensive hull of A, to be





+ j z  x for some x 2 A
	
:
Let  be the set of all non-trivial, compact and comprehensive subsets
of Rn
+. Elements in  are interpreted as (normalized) bargaining problems.
A bargaining solution F assigns a nonempty subset F(A) of A for every
bargaining problem A 2 .
6Let  be a permutation of N. The set of all permutations of N is denoted
by . For all x = (xi)i2N 2 Rn
+, and any permutation , let (x) = (x(i))i2N.
For all A 2  and any permutation , let (A) = f(a) j a 2 Ag. For any
A 2 , we say that A is symmetric if A = (A) for all permutations  over
N.
For all A 2  and all i 2 N, let mi(A) = maxfai j (a1;;ai;;an) 2
Ag. Therefore, m(A)  (mi(A))i2N is the ideal point of A.
Denition 1: A bargaining solution F over  is the Nash solution if for all




i2N xi for all x 2 Ag.
Denote the Nash solution by F N. Note that, for nonconvex bargaining prob-
lems, the Nash solution is typically multi-valued.
3 Basic axioms and their implications
In this section, we present several standard axioms and examine their impli-
cations for solutions to bargaining problems. We begin by introducing three
axioms, Eciency, Anonymity and Scale Invariance, which are standard in
the literature on Nash bargaining problems.
Eciency (E): For any A 2  and any a 2 F(A), there is no x 2 A such
that x > a.
Anonymity (A): For any A 2 , if A is symmetric, then [a 2 F(A) )
(a) 2 F(A) for any permutation  over N].
Scale Invariance (SI): For all A 2  and all  2 Rn
++, if A = f(iai)i2N j
a 2 Ag, then F(A) = f(iai)i2N j a 2 F(A)g.
The following axiom is a weaker version of Weak Axiom of Revealed
Preference (WARP) used in the theory of revealed preference (Samuelson
(1938, 1947)). The standard (WARP) such as dened in Sen (1971) requires
that if an option z is \revealed to be worse" than another option x in the sense
that there is a problem containing x and z from which x is chosen but z is
not, then z should not be chosen from any problem as a solution as long as x
is available. The following axiom is much weaker than the standard (WARP)
in that its premise only takes a specic type of problem: the comprehensive
7hull of x and another point containing z, from which x is chosen but z is
not. Note that an option set as a pair of two points is typically discussed in
the rational choice theory. The comprehensive hull of two points is a natural
generalization of a two-point set in rational choice theory for the domain of
bargaining problems considered here. The axiom is stated as follows:
Binary Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (BWARP): For all
x;y;z 2 Rn
+ with y > z, if either fx;yg = F(compfx;yg) or fxg =
F(compfx;zg), then z = 2 F (A) for any A 2  with x;z 2 A.
(BWARP) requires that, if an option z is \revealed to be worse" than another
option x via a \pairwise comparison" involving x and z directly or through
a \pairwise comparison" involving x and y where y vectorially dominates z,
then z should not be chosen as a solution as long as x is available.
It may be noted that (BWARP) represents a weak property of rational
choice: it can be checked that, if a solution satises (E) and (BWARP), then
there is an acyclic relation P over Rn
+ such that for any A 2 , [x 2 F (A) )
@y 2 A s.t. yPx].
We now explore the implications of the above axioms being imposed on a
solution to nonconvex bargaining problems. Our rst result shows that, when
a solution satises (E), (A), (SI), and (BWARP), then, for any x;y 2 Rn
+, the
solution to the problem A = compfx;yg must be such that F(A) = fx;yg
if i2Nxi = i2Nyi > 0 and F(A) = fxg if i2Nxi > i2Nyi; that is, for a
specic, simple problem given by A dened earlier, these axioms imply that
the solution to A must be given by the Nash solution. After establishing our
rst result, we show, in Proposition 2, that, when a solution satises (E),
(A), (SI), and (BWARP), then the solution to any bargaining problem must
be a subset of the Nash solution.
Proposition 1. Let a solution F satisfy (E), (A), (SI), and (BWARP).
















i2N yi > 0. Consider an appropriate  2 Rn
++
such that x and y are permutations of each other (such  always exists
because x and y have the same value of their respective Nash product). Let
S  compfx;yg. Then, let T  [2 (S). By construction, T is sym-
metric, and
8f (x); (y) j  2 g  T is the set of all ecient outcomes in T. Thus,
F (T)  f (x); (y) j  2 g, and let x 2 F (T). Then, by (A),
f (x) j  2 g  F (T). Also, since x and y are permutations of each
other, y 2 F (T) by (A). Then, again by (A), f (y) j  2 g  F (T).
Thus, F (T) = f (x); (y) j  2 g. Thus, x;y 2 F (T). Then, by






i2N yi  0. Then, by choosing an appropriate
" 2 Rn




i2N zi for z  y + ". Then,
by (1.1), F(compfx;zg) = fx;zg. Then, by (BWARP), y = 2 F(compfx;yg).
Thus, by (E), F(compfx;yg) = fxg. 
Proposition 2. Let a solution F satisfy (E), (A), (SI), and (BWARP).
Then, for any A 2 , F(A)  F N (A).
Proof. Take any A 2  and x 2 F (A). Suppose x = 2 F N (A). Then, there




i2N xi  0. Then, by Proposition
1.2, F(compfx;yg) = fyg. Then, by (BWARP), x = 2 F (A) since y 2 A,
which is a contradiction. 
Our Proposition 2 can be regarded as a partial characterization of the
Nash solution to nonconvex bargaining problems. It also shows that if we are
interested in recommending from the naturally restricted domain an ecient
solution having some (weak) property of rational choice such as (BWARP),
we must choose from the set of options contained in the Nash solution.
It is also worth noting that Proposition 2 does not provide a full charac-
terization of all selections from the Nash solution: by means of (E), (A), (SI),












yi  0 ) F(compfx;yg) = fx;yg
)
:






i2N yi  0, F 0(compfx;yg) = fxg holds, which
does not satisfy at least one of the four axioms in Proposition 2. In this
paper, we are not interested in such a Nash-selection, since the solution like
9F 0 seems inappropriate from the point of eciency and equity-as-anonymity
considerations.5
4 Proposing Two Sequential Choice Proce-
dures
Given Proposition 2 in the last section, if we are interested in solutions having
certain properties like (E), (A), (SI) and (BWARP), then we are conned to
considering alternatives recommended by the Nash solution. Given the multi-
valuedness of the Nash solution, the Nash solution is not necessarily attrac-
tive as it typically contains many undesirable outcomes in terms of fairness.
Thus, as alternative recommendations, we introduce two renements of the
Nash solution to nonconvex problems. Our rst renement of the Nash solu-
tion selects, for each bargaining problem A, all the points in F N(A) that also
lie on the highest indierence surface given by min(a1=m1(A);;an=mn(A))
attainable in A. Specically, it is dened as follows:
Denition 2: A bargaining solution over  is a type 1 proportional Nash











for all x 2 F N(A)g.
Therefore, for any given problem A, to obtain F 1pN(A), we rst nd out
the Nash solution, F N(A), to the bargaining problem A, and then, from
the Nash solution set F N(A), we select all the points lying on the highest
indierence surface given by min(a1=m1(A);;an=mn(A)). Note that the
set F N(A) may not intersect the line segment linking the disagreement point
0 and the ideal point m(A), and consequently, the KS solution with reference
to the ideal point m(A) may not exist for the problem F N(A). The highest
indierence surface given by min(a1=m1(A);;an=mn(A)) is an alternative
to the KS solution in our context (see, for example, Tanaka and Nagahisa
(2002), Wu (2006), and Wu and Xu (2009), for this version of the KS solution
to discrete bargaining problems). Viewed in this way, the solution F 1pN can





i2N yi  0 such that x and y
are permutations of each other, it seems inappropriate for any eciency and equity-as-
anonymity considerations to exclude one of x and y from F(compfx;yg). Thus, given (SI),







i  0, any eciency and equity-as-anonymity
considerations may not require excluding one of x0 and y0 from F(compfx0;y0g).
10be regarded as a procedural rule which rst applies the Nash solution to
exclude certain options in A and then applies the idea of the KS solution to
select the nal options.
Our next renement of the Nash solution selects, for each bargaining prob-
lem, all the points in F N(A) that lie on the highest indierence surface given
by min(a1=m1(F N(A));;an=mn(F N(A))) attainable in A. Note that, in
this case, the referenced ideal point is m(F N(A)), where m(F N(A)) is the
ideal point of the bargaining problem comp(F N(A)). More precisely, we
introduce the following solution:
Denition 3: A bargaining solution over  is a type 2 proportional Nash











for all x 2 F N(A)g.
For any problem A, to obtain F 2pN, we again rst nd out the Nash
solution, F N(A), to the problem A, and then from the Nash solution set
F N(A), we select all the points lying on the highest indierence surface
given by min(a1=m1(compF N(A));;an=mn(compF N(A))). Note that the
referenced ideal point in the solution F 2pN is the ideal point of the problem
compF N(A) which is dierent from the referenced ideal point for the solution
F 1pN. Like F 1pN, the solution F 2pN can also be regarded as a procedural rule
in which two procedures for selecting options are employed sequentially.
As noted in the Introduction, our two solution concepts are similar to the
notion of sequential rationalizability of choice functions discussed in Manzini
and Mariotti (2006, 2007) and in Tadenuma (2002). However, there is a
signicant dierence between the two concepts. The dierence is that F 1pN
(to abuse the notion, we interpret F 1pN as a choice function here) cannot
be a sequentially rationalizable choice function. To see this, for a given
binary relation R  Rn
+  Rn
+ with P (R) as its corresponding strict part,
let max(A;R)  fx 2 A j 8y 2 A : (y;x) = 2 P (R)g. Then, a choice function
C is sequentially rationalizable if there exist two binary relations R1;R2 over
Rn
+ such that, for any A 2 , C(A) = max(max(A;R1);R2). Now, let RN 
Rn
+  Rn
+ be a binary relation such that for any x;y 2 Rn





i2N yi. If F 1pN is a sequentially rationalizable choice
function, then there must be another binary relation R1p  Rn
+  Rn
+ such





















11is such that for any x;y 2 Rn
+, (x;y) 2 R
1p











. This suggests that R
1p
A may vary according to the feasible
set A, which implies that F 1pN is not sequentially rationalizable. In a similar
fashion, we note that F 2pN is not sequentially rationalizable.
However, as also noted in the Introduction, the endogenous nature of the
underlying second criterion R
1p
A is perhaps a desired feature of F 1pN. This
is because R
1p
A represents an ethical principle in terms of procedural fairness
stipulating what social outcomes should be selected from which feasible op-
tion set. In F 1pN, the necessary information about feasible option sets for
identifying the ranking R
1p
A is of m(A). A similar rationale behind F 2pN can
be developed along the same line.
To see that F 1pN and F 2pN are (proper) renements of the Nash solution,
consider the following bargaining problem:
A = compf(0;0);(4;0);(2;2);(1;4);(3=2;8=3)g
Then, F N(A) = f(2;2);(1;4);(3=2;8=3)g;F 1pN(A) = f(2;2)g;F 2pN(A) =
f(3=2;8=3)g. This example also suggests that, in general, F 1pN and F 2pN
are two distinct solution concepts.
To conclude this section, we note that, for convex bargaining problems,
both F 1pN and F 2pN coincide with the Nash solution F N. This implies that
each of F 1pN and F 2pN is, respectively, an extension of the standard Nash
solution dened for convex problems to nonconvex problems.
5 Characterization of F1pN
In this section, we study the behavior of the solution F 1pN. We begin by
introducing a notation. For all x 2 Rn
+, let  x = maxfxi 2 R+ j i = 1;;ng
and x = minfxi 2 R+ j i = 1;;ng. Next, we note that F 1pN satises the
following two axioms.
Equity Principle (EP): For all A 2  such that A is symmetric and for
all x 2 A, if there exists y 2 A such that fx;yg = F(compfx;yg) and
(x;;x) < y < ( x;;  x), then x = 2 F(A).
Weak Contraction Independence (WCI): For any A;B 2 , if m(A) =
m(B), A  B and A \ F(B) 6= ?, then F(A) = F (B) \ A.
12Axiom (EP) reects an equity concern in making a solution recommenda-
tion for bargaining problems. It says that, for any symmetric problem A and
for any two points, x and y, in A, if, in the simple bargaining problem formed
by the comprehensive hull of x and y, they both are chosen as the solution to
the problem compfx;yg, but the maximum (resp. minimum) utility specied
in x is greater (resp. less) than the maximum (resp. minimum) utility spec-
ied in y (so that the utility distribution under y is more evenly distributed
than under x), then x should not be chosen from A. It may be noted that
this equity idea is originated from the Hammond equity (Hammond (1976))
which is embedded in the requirements that (x;;x) < y < ( x;;  x) and
that A is a symmetric problem. Axiom (WCI) is a familiar axiom used for
characterizing the KS solution for nonconvex bargaining problems (see, for
example, Xu and Yoshihara (2006)).
With the help of axioms (EP) and (WCI), we obtain the following result,
which is a characterization of F 1pN.
Theorem 1. A solution F satises (E), (A), (SI), (BWARP), (WCI), and
(EP) if and only if F = F 1pN.
Proof. It can be checked that F 1pN satises (E), (A), (SI), (BWARP),
(WCI), and (EP). We now show that a solution F satisfying (E), (A), (SI),
(BWARP), (WCI), and (EP) must be F 1pN. Let F satisfy (E), (A), (SI),
(BWARP), (WCI), and (EP).
Take any A 2  and x 2 F 1pN(A). By Proposition 2, F(A)  F N(A).
Take any y 2 F N(A)nF 1pN(A), and suppose y 2 F(A). Consider  2 Rn
++
such that mi(A0) = mj(A0) for any i;j 2 N, where A0  A. Then, by
(SI), y0 2 F(A0), where y0  y and x0  x. Then, consider S 
compfx0;y0;(m1 (A0);0 1);:::;(mn (A0);0 n)g  A0. Then, by (WCI),
y0 2 F(S). Also consider S0  compfx0;y0g. Then, by Proposition 1.1.,
fx0;y0g = F(S0). Next, consider T  [2 (S). Then, by (A), (WCI),
and (E), f (y0)g2  F(T). Thus, note that S0 [ T = T is symmetric and
fx0;y0g = F(compfx0;y0g). Let y0  (y0;;y0) and y0  (y0;;y0).
Then, since x0 2 F 1pN(A0) and y0 2 F N(A0)nF 1pN(A0), we have y0 > x0 >
y0. Thus, by (EP) and (A), f (y0)g2 cannot be a subset of F(T), which is
a contradiction. Thus, for any y 2 F N(A)nF 1pN(A), y = 2 F(A). Combining
with Proposition 2, we conclude that F(A)  F 1pN(A). Finally, we can see
that F(A) = F 1pN(A) by (SI) and (A). 
From Theorem 1, we can see that F 1pN satises most of the axioms which
13KS solution to nonconvex problems satises.6 Note that it can be checked
that the KS solution to nonconvex problems is characterized by the properties
of weak eciency and single-valuedness together with (A), (SI), and (WCI)
(see, for example, Xu and Yoshihara (2006) and Lombardi and Yoshihara
(2010)). Moreover, this solution also satises (BWARP) and (EP). Thus, it
is solely (E) among the axioms used in Theorem 1, which the KS solution
does not satisfy. In contrast, F 1pN does not have the property of single-
valuedness. These may suggest that, in the presence of the other axioms,
there is a trade-o between eciency and single-valuedness in nonconvex
bargaining problems.
To conclude this section, we discuss the independence of the axioms g-
ured in Theorem 1 by focusing on (BWARP), (EP) and (WCI). Note that
F 2pN satises (E), (A), (SI), (BWARP) and (EP), but violates (WCI), F N
satises (E), (A), )(SI), (BWARP) and (WCI), but violates (EP). Finally,
consider the following solution F P: for all A 2 , let P(A) be the Pareto set











all x 2 P(A)g. It can be checked that F P satises (E), (A), (SI), (EP) and
(WCI) but violates (BWARP).
6 Characterization of F2pN
In this section, we study the behavior of the solution F 2pN. First, let us
introduce a notation. For any A 2 , let P (A) be the set of Pareto ecient
utility vectors in A. We now introduce two axioms that are satised by F 2pN:
Weak WCI (WWCI) For all A;B 2  with m(A) = m(B) and P(A) 
P(B) such that fx;yg = F(compfx;yg) for all x;y 2 P(B), if F(B)\A 6= ?,
then F(A) = F(B) \ A.
Ecient Frontier Contraction Independence (EFCI): For all A;B 2 
such that P(A)  P(B) and [fx;yg = F(compfx;yg) for all x;y 2 P (A)],
if z = 2 F(compfx;zg) for any z 2 P (B)nP (A) and any x 2 P (A), then
[F (B) \ A 6= ? implies F (A) = F (B) \ A].
6The KS solution can be dened as usual: for all A 2 , FKS(A) = fx 2 A j
x1=m1(A) =  = xn=mn(A); and there exists no y 2 A such that y  xg.
14Axiom (WWCI) is a weaker version of axiom (WCI) in that it puts certain
restrictions on the applicability of bargaining problems A and B specied
under (WCI): it requires that the Pareto set of A is a subset of the Pareto set
of B and that every two points x and y in the Pareto set of B must be chosen
as solutions to the problem compfx;yg. Essentially, (WWCI) stipulates that,
in situations involving two bargaining problems A and B, if they have the
same ideal point and if the Pareto set of A is contained in the Pareto set of B,
whenever every two ecient points in B are \informationally equivalent" in
the sense of both being recommended as solutions to the bargaining problem
formed by the comprehensive hull of the two points, it must be the case that
the solution to A consists of all those points that are \chosen" in B and
that continue to be available in A if the chosen ones in B overlap with A.
This is built on the intuition that, in such cases, the information concerning
\learning" and \updating" under A is identical to that under B (in particular,
for each individual, the maximum attainable utility under A is exactly the
same as the maximum attainable utility under B so that the updated \ideal
points" for both problems are the same), and, as a consequence, any point
recommended for B must continue to be recommended for A as long as this
point is available in A.
Axiom (EFCI) is another type of Contraction Independence and requires
that, for any two bargaining problems A and B, if the Pareto set of A is a
subset of the Pareto set B, every two points x and y in P(A) are both chosen
from the problem compfx;yg, and any point z in P(B) n P(A) is \worse"
than any point x 2 P(A), then the solution to A must coincide with F(B)\A
as long as F(B) \ A is not empty. Under the situation where the premise of
(EFCI) is satised, any point z in P(B)nP(A) seems irrelevant for the choice
under B since z is \dominated" by every point in P(A). This suggests that
in such cases, the essential features of the bargaining problem B are exactly
the same as those of the bargaining problem A. It is therefore reasonable to
require the coincidence of F(A) with F(B) \ A whenever F(B) \ A is not
empty.
With the help of axioms (EFCI) and (WWCI), we are ready to state the
following result which characterizes F 2pN.
Theorem 2. A solution F satises (E), (A), (SI), (BWARP), (EP), (EFCI),
and (WWCI) if and only if F = F 2pN.
Proof. It can be checked that F 2pN satises (E), (A), (SI), (BWARP), (EP),
15(EFCI), and (WWCI). We now show that a solution F satisfying (E), (A),
(SI), (BWARP), (EP), (EFCI), and (WWCI) must be F 2pN.
Let F be such a solution. Take any A 2  and x 2 F 2pN(A). By
Proposition 2, F(A)  F N(A). Take any y 2 F N(A)nF 2pN(A), and sup-
pose y 2 F(A). Let compF N (A)  [x2FN(A)compfxg, and denote A0 
compF N (A). Then, F N (A0) = F N(A)  F (A). Moreover, since z 2
P (A)nP (A0), z = 2 F(compfx;zg) holds for any x 2 P (A0) by Proposition
1.2, thus F (A0) = F(A) \ A0 follows from (EFCI). Moreover, by (BWARP),
z = 2 F(A) holds for any z 2 P (A)nP (A0), since z = 2 F(compfx;zg) holds
for any x 2 P (A0)  A. Thus, the last property and (E) together imply
F (A0) = F(A).
Let  2 Rn
++ be such that mi(S0) = mj(S0) for any i;j 2 N, where
S0  A0. Then, by (SI), y0 2 F(S0) and x0 2 S0, where y0  y and
x0  x. Next, consider T  [2 (S0). Then, by (A), (E), and (WWCI),
F(T) = [2 (F(S0)).
Also consider S00  compfx0;y0g. Then, by Proposition 1.1., fx0;y0g =
F(S00). Note that S00 [ T = T is symmetric. Let y0  (y0;;y0) and
y0  (y0;;y0). Then, since x0 2 F 2pN(S0) and y0 2 F N(S0)nF 2pN(S0), we
have y0 > x0 > y0. Thus, by (EP) and (A), f (y0)g2 * F(T). However,
since f (y0)g2  f (F (S0))g2 = F(T), this is a contradiction. Thus,
for any y 2 F N(A)nF 2pN(A), y = 2 F(A). This implies F(A)  F 2pN(A).
Let x;y 2 F 2pN(A), and suppose y 2 F(A) and x = 2 F(A). Since
x;y 2 F 2pN(A), x and y are permutations of each other. Let us consider
A0  compF N (A) and S0  A0 as  2 Rn
++ such that mi(S0) = mj(S0)
for any i;j 2 N. Moreover, T  [2 (S0). Then, by (SI), (A), (E),
and (WWCI), F(T) = [2 (F(S0)), so that f (y0)g2  F(T), where
y0  y. Then, since x and y are permutations of each other, x 2
f (y0)g2, thus x 2 F(S0) by (WWCI), so that x 2 F(A0) by (SI).
Since F (A0) = F(A), x 2 F(A) holds, which is a contradiction. Thus,
F(A) = F 2pN(A) holds. 
Again, noting that the KS solution does not satisfy (EFCI), Theorem 2
suggests that F 2pN has the same properties except (E) and (EFCI), as the
KS solution to nonconvex problems.
As for the independence of the axioms gured in Theorem 2, we focus on
(BWARP), (EP), (EFCI) and (WWCI). Note that F N satises (E), (A), (SI),
(BWARP), (EFCI), and (WWCI) but violates (EP), F 1pN satises (E), (A),
(SI), (BWARP), (EP) and (WWCI) but violates (EFCI). Consider the fol-
16lowing solution F : for all A 2 , if F N(A) is symmetric or if (F N(A))
is symmetric for some  2 Rn
++, then F (A) = F 2pN(A), and if other-
wise, F (A) = F 1pN(A). It can be checked that F  satises (E), (A), (SI),
(BWARP), (EP), (EFCI), but violates (WWCI).
Finally, to see the independence of (BWARP), let bi   be the class of
problems such that for each A 2 bi, there exist two alternatives x;y 2 P (A)
such that m(compfx;yg) = m(A) and F P (A) \ fx;yg 6= ?. Dene F P2 as
follows: for any A 2 , if A 2 bi with m(compfx;yg) = m(A) for some
x;y 2 P (A), then F P2 (A) = fx;yg; if A 2 nbi, then F P2 (A) = F P (A).
Consider #N = 2. Note that F P2 satises (E), (SI), (A), and (EP).
Let us check (WWCI). Take B 2 nbi. Then, since F P2 (B) = F P (B).
Let A 2  be such that the premise of (WWCI) holds for A and B. Thus,
F P (A)\fx;yg = ? follows from F P2 (B)\A 6= ? and F P (B)\fx;yg = ?.
Thus, A 2 nbi, so that F P2 (A) = F P (A), which implies that F P2 (A) =
F P2 (B) \ A. Take B 2 bi. Then, there exist x;y 2 P (B) such that
m(compfx;yg) = m(B) and F P (B)\fx;yg 6= ?. Then, F P2 (B) = fx;yg.
Let A 2  be such that the premise of (WWCI) holds for A and B. Then,
m(compfx;yg) = m(B) = m(A) and P (A)  P (B) imply that fx;yg 
P (A). Thus, F P (A)\fx;yg 6= ?. Thus, A 2 bi, so that F P2 (A) = fx;yg.
In summary, F P2 satises (WWCI).
Let us check (EFCI). Take any A;B 2  such that P(A)  P(B) and
[fx;yg = F P2(compfx;yg) for all x;y 2 P (A)]. Note that for any z 2
P (B)nP (A) and any x 2 P (A), fx;zg = F P2(compfx;zg) holds, since
compfx;zg 2 bi. Thus, (EFCI) is vacuously satised.
Finally, let us see F P2 violates (BWARP). Take x;y;z 2 Rn
+ with y > z.
Note that compfx;yg;compfx;zg 2 bi. Then, fx;yg = F P2(compfx;yg)
holds, but fx;zg = F P2(compfx;zg) also holds, which implies the violation
of (BWARP).
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced two new solutions for nonconvex bargaining
problems and studied them axiomatically. The two solutions that we propose
are procedural: for any given problem A, we rst apply the Nash criterion
to exclude those points that give lower Nash product than the maximum
Nash product in A, and then, we apply another procedure based on the
idea of the KS solution for nonconvex bargaining problems to select those
17that are considered to be \equitable" among those maximum-Nash-product
points. The procedure based on the KS solution requires the information
about an ideal point. In the paper, we have studied two possibilities of
selecting an ideal point: the rst one is the ideal point of the underlying
bargaining problem, and the second one is the ideal point of the bargaining
problem consisting of the maximum Nash product points from the underlying
bargaining problem. Our procedural approach to bargaining problems opens
a new possibility of investigating bargaining solutions, namely, solutions that
are based on sequential eliminations of certain alternatives in bargaining
problems.
It may be of interest to note that, in the rst stage, each of the two new
solutions discussed in this paper applies the Nash solution to eliminate cer-
tain alternatives from a bargaining problem. One may wonder if there is any
rationale for doing this and why one would not start with any other solution
concept in the rst stage. There seem at least two reasons for employing
the Nash solution in the rst stage. First, suppose that we are interested
in employing, in the rst stage, a solution that has some `minimal' ratio-
nality property such as BWARP. Then, in the framework of cardinal, non-
comparable individual utilities, as shown by Proposition 2, we do not have
many choices: the Nash solution is the only candidate. Secondly, suppose
that we would like to employ a solution that is ecient (so that our proce-
dures for selecting a solution would be based on the eciency-rst principle).
Then, the Nash solution seems a `natural' candidate in the framework. Of
course, if one would like to use an `equity-oriented' solution in the rst stage,
it would then open for other possibilities. We leave these possibilities for
another occasions.
There is a set of core axioms satised by both of the two solutions studied
in this paper: (E), (A), (SI), (BWARP) and (EP). The two solutions dier
with respect to specic axioms of contraction independence: F 1pN satises
(WCI) and (WWCI) but violates (EFCI), whereas F 2pN satises (WWCI)
and (EFCI) but violates (WCI). The following table summarizes the proper-
ties of the Nash, KS, F 1pN and F 2pN solutions discussed in the paper where
 indicates the specied solution satises the corresponding axiom while 
indicates otherwise :
18N KS F 1pN F 2pN
(E)    
(A)    
(SI)    
(BWARP)    
(EP)    
(WCI)    
(EFCI)    
(WWCI)    
To conclude the paper, we note that our framework can be readily adapted
to studying collective choice problems where each bargaining problem can be
interpreted as a feasible set available to a xed number of individuals in the
society and a solution can be interpreted as a collective choice function. With
this reinterpretation, the axioms employed in the paper can be reformulated
and re-interpreted accordingly. This seems to open a new possibility of in-
vestigating and studying collective choice problems. It would be interesting
to explore this possibility in various contexts.
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